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Responsibility: A Psychiatrist's
Point of View
By DR. M. A. SKLANSKY*

THE

CONCEPT of

responsibility is used in several ways:

1) Trustworthiness, e.g., "He is a responsible lawyer and
family man."
2) Blameworthiness (culpability or deserving of punishment)
e.g., "He is responsible for the accident."
8) Causality, e.g., "His psychosis was responsible for his bizarre behavior." In our discussions of the concept of responsibility, we frequently use it in several ways, often simultaneously,
and much of the confusion on the subject arises from this multiple
use.'
I am to present the psychiatrist's viewpoint on the concept of
responsibility. But how the psychiatrist views this concept depends very much on the frame of reference in which he uses it,
and this frame of reference depends very much on what role the
psychiatrist assumes at the time of his viewing. The psychiatrist
is many persons in one. His several roles, unless he is aware of
them, may interfere with his professional function. The psychiatrist, like everyone else, is a unique individual with a personal
history and a personal destiny. As a unique individual, he reacts
to this question of responsibility in ways which may be characteristic of his individual personality. Thus, when he is moralistic or vindictive, he may look upon responsibility as culpability,
as deserving of punishment. Then he, like the law and the rest
of the community, is reacting to the concept from the traditional
point of view of seeking to place the blame for an act. If the
psychiatrist is overly empathic with the individual under con* Psychiatrist & Psychoanalyst; Clinical Assistant Professor of Psychiatry, University of Illinois, School of Medicine, Chicago, Ill.
1 Szasz, Thomas A., "Psychiatry and the Law", Archives of Neurology and
Psychiatry, May, 1956.
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sideration, he may react with a desire to avoid punishment and
then looks upon responsibility as culpability which the individual
must be absolved from. If the individual under consideration is a
nine-year-old boy who steals a spoon, the psychiatrist, like others,
reacts differently to the question of the boy's responsibility than
if the criminal is a grown man who butchers a nine-year-old boy.
As a member of the community, the psychiatrist may be concerned
for the welfare of the whole community and reacts then in terms
of how the community may be protected or benefited. As a member of the same community, he is under pressure from his fellows
and their attitudes, and he will then react to the concept of
responsibility in terms of this community pressure. 2 For example,
the psychiatrist, whose expert testimony might save a grown
murderer of a child, will sometimes hardly escape hanging himself
if the community is up in arms. As a physician, the psychiatrist
may be interested in the health of the individual with whom he
is concerned and then he looks upon responsibility as a function
which has been interfered with by some process which may or
may not be benefited by therapy. Finally, as a scientist, the psychiatrist may study this concept of responsibility as it is used by
his fellow human beings and as be sees it manifested as a form of
human behavior and as human experience. In each instance, he
may be interested in studying the meaning, function and development of the concept of responsibility.
Now let me speak from the point of view that the psychiatrist
is usually called upon to speak-that of the scientist and the physician. When the scientist examines what the community and the
law expects, he finds that they are interested in responsibility as
culpability or blameworthiness. They are not interested in
causality per se nor even rehabilitation of the offender. It is their
interest and their business to punish the individual who is to
blame for his act and not to punish him if he is not to blame.
This is not in and of itself the scientist's business. But he can try
to determine what the community and the law think is blameworthiness and he soon finds that all of the issues are reduced to
whether the individual, of his own free will, chose to act as he did.
Can the psychiatrist answer this question?
2
Zilboorg, Gregory, Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment, Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1954.
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As the scientist, the psychiatrist is called upon to explain
human behavior. The psychiatrist is supposed to know most
about individual human behavior. He is expected to understand
totality of the individual as a psychosocial being, the effects of the
body and of psychic functions and social influence on the individual. The psychiatrist observes that normal individuals have
the capacity to make decisions, to choose, and to will to act. These
functions are functions of the conscious portion of the ego. Moreover, the individual subjectively experiences them as a process of
evaluating, choosing and willing to act. But the integrity of these
functions depends on the integrity of numerous related functions.
Indeed, volition and cognition cannot be isolated and separated
from all of the ego integrated functions. An act finally depends
on the ego's capacity to integrate internal instinctual pressures,
personal values, cultural requirements and the perceptions of
reality. Individual behavior at any moment is the outcome of the
nature of the individual's constitution, the influence of numerous
factors in his life history, the result of various pressures upon him,
both internal and external, past and present. The psychiatrist
observes that variations and vicissitudes in each of these interrelated psychic phenomena will determine the ultimate capacity
of the individual to choose, decide, and control or act. Freedom
of the will is an undeniable, subjective experience of the normal
mind. The individual's subjective experience of responsibilitythat is, his feeling blameworthiness-includes this experience of
freedom of the will, the experience of being able to choose between actions and to decide in favor of one or another. Responsibility as a subjective experience includes also a conscious awareness and cognition of the reality in which one exists. And finally,
the subjective experience of responsibility includes the sense of
right and wrong-a reaction of the ego to conscience.
So, when the psychiatrist examines this concept of responsibility
as culpability, he sees that all of the institutions of mental function
are involved-the strength of the impulses, the character of the
conscience, the integrative capacities of the ego. Defect in one or
another of these psychic institutions may then result in "pathology
of responsibility." Difficulty arises for the psychiatrist in those
cases where it is not easy to reveal these defects to the satisfaction
of judge and jury. There are no precise measurements, no final
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tests that can be presented, no simple statements that can be made
in each and every case. Mental disorder or disease is not always
sharply differentiated from so-called normal minds. Psychoanalytic
experience leads to the observation that among those individuals,
who are not held culpable, there are defects in function, not unlike
those of individuals who are held culpable from the point of view
of the community and the law. Defects of conscience or super-ego
vary from the almost acceptable beating of the income tax or
bribing a policeman, to the guiltless deprivation of the livelihood
and life of others. The yielding to impulse we see universally, at
least in fantasy. Sometimes these impulses exist with great feeling.
Frequently, feeling is separated from them. Sometimes the impulses are actually acted upon and the individual may never be
discovered nor held responsible even if discovered, depending
upon numerous considerations, often on the social class from
which he comes. Failures of the ego we see varying from the common losing of one's temper in anger or yielding to the intensity of
a sexual passion, to various forms of stealing and destroying. In
some instances we are tolerant and understanding of such failures,
for example, in children up to the age of fifteen or so, in wealthy
ladies who suffer from kleptomania or in the promiscuity that
takes place socially or in adolescent orgies. Of others, we are not
so tolerant, depending on the temper of the social atmosphere and
on the degree of sympathy with the person who commits the act.
Now let me treat the concept of responsibility in the sense of
"causality". What is responsible for the defects in "responsibility?" What is responsible for the criminal act? The psychiatrist
is not yet in a position always to explain why there are failures in
ego function. But he can make approximations. 3 A careful study
of the individual as a totality, as far as we are able, of his functioning past and present, the forces, bodily, psychic and social that
act on him, help the psychiatrist make an evaluation of the capacity
of the individual to evaluate, choose, will, control and act. 4 And
more important, from the point of view of the community, he may
suggest what can be done, if anything, to alter that behavior beneficially. Of course, when the psychiatrist discovers organic disease
3

Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry Report No. 26, "Criminal Re-

sponsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testimony", May, 1954.
4 Guttmacher, Manfred, 'The Quest for a Test of Criminal Responsibility",
American Journal of Psychiatry, Dec., 1954.
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his task is simpler. Anatomical localization of the ego functions
which have to do with the control of impulse or of the super-ego,
from which such control is dictated, have certainly not been
ascertained. That the frontal lobes play a highly significant role
in the maintenance of these functions is suggested by the effects
of injury, disease and surgery in these lobes. In the grosser pathologies of the psychoses, ego breakdown is more manifest, but
even in these conditions, the psychiatrist cannot always show that
a particular act is a product of the disease itself nor is it always
clear that in every psychosis these functions are interfered with.
On the other hand, the psychiatrist's task is not made easier when
he indicates that every act is, after all, part of the totality of individual function.
Experience indicates that the ego's capacity to integrate, make
decisions and control may be increased through psychiatric treatment. In working with delinquent adolescents and acting-out
neurotics, we see that a shift can take place in the direction of
impulse, and we know that self control and even feelings of guilt,
which help to control, can be developed. We know that identification with "ideal figures" may hold back impulses or discharge
them in socially acceptable forms. But this is an over-simplified
and minimal statement. As the community alters its attitude toward those in whom responsibility has failed, when the desire for
punishment gives way to an interest in rehabilitation, as facilities
increase for custodial care and study of these individuals, opportunities for the accumulation of scientific knowledge about them
will increase and then more meaningful statements and therapeutic procedures may be come upon.
The history of the community's attitude toward the irresponsible indicates that this may eventually come to pass, though indeed progress is slow. The effect of capital punishment as a
deterrent is being disavowed, 5 and individuals who commit capital
offenses may be saved. In some areas, the McNaghten Rule is giving place to the New Hampshire Law and the Durham Rule.6
Here, individuals will no longer be declared legally sane or insane
simply on the question of knowledge of good and evil, right and
5 Cook, Fred J., "Capital Punishment-Does It Prevent Crime?" The Nation,
March 10, 1956.
6 Sobeloff, Judge Simon E. "McNaghten to Durham and Beyond", Psychiatric
Quarterly, July, 1955.
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wrong, but all information that can be obtained, which will
elucidate why responsibility has failed, will have an opportunity
to be evaluated. Although we still seek to punish the blameworthy, changes take place even here. Psychotics, sexual psychopaths, children, adolescents are more often recommended for
treatment, even now, rather than for punishment.
The psychiatrist, like others, is concerned with the community
welfare and he does not yet know what can best be done to benefit
that welfare in the handling of those who commit criminal acts.
But he knows that difficult though the task may be, the goal lies
in the direction of studying the cause of irresponsibility to determine what may be done to avoid the criminal act. He is not convinced that punishment is always the only deterrent. That it is
effective in some cases is evident, but what makes it so? How and
when can it best be applied? Punishment is today used more out
of vindictive emotionality rather than as a procedure to alter behavior. As yet, we lack facilities as well as knowledge for the
adequate solution of this extremely difficult problem, but this is
no argument for the continuation of archaic attitudes and treatment. Rather, it is an indication of the direction in which we
must go. Courts may become agencies for the protection and
benefit of the community by serving in the task of diagnosis and
disposition of those in whom responsibility has failed. In this way
we fulfill our responsibility to each other as fellow human beings
in making life together more livable.

